STUDYING INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AT CHICAGO IN THE 1930S: THE CASE OF ARTHUR BLOOMFIELD by Asso, PF & Fiorito, L
STUDYING INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS AT CHICAGO IN
THE 1930S: THE CASE OF ARTHUR
BLOOMFIELD
Pier Francesco Asso and Luca Fiorito
Keywords: Arthur Bloomfield; Frank Knight; Thorstein Veblen;
institutionalism; Chicago economics
Arthur Bloomfield (19141998) was a fine international economist and an
original historian of economics. A native of Montreal, Bloomfield was edu-
cated at McGill University, where he studied under Joseph Hemmeon
and Stephen Leacock and received his M.A. in 1936. His thesis was on
Canadian wheat marketing policy during the Great Depression.
Disappointed by the economics he had learned at Montreal, in the fall of
1936 he went to Chicago to begin postgraduate studies. There he studied
under the guidance of some of the leading American economists of the age,
several of whom would later be identified with the so-called first Chicago
School of Economics.
The crucial event that brought Bloomfield to the University of Chicago
was a letter from Harry Millis, then the chairman of the Department of
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Economics at Chicago, who encouraged him to enroll in the Ph.D. pro-
gram and offered him some form of financial support. “Bolstered by that
letter,” Bloomfield (1994, p. 4) wrote, “I went to Chicago in the fall of
1936, with little money in my pocket but hopeful that somehow or other
I would manage to get by.” The real scientific motivation for Bloomfield’s
favoring Chicago was, however, the presence there of another Canadian in
the Department of Economics, his future mentor Jacob Viner: “I had read
and admired some of his writings and was anxious to meet him and study
under him” (Bloomfield, 1994, p. 4).
Bloomfield’s hopes and expectations would soon come true. After his arri-
val at Chicago, Bloomfield took Viner’s famous course on price and distribu-
tion theory and was offered the opportunity to become his research assistant
for his long awaited book, Studies in the Theory of International Trade
(1937). Under Viner’s influence, Bloomfield soon developed his lifelong
interest in international economics and the history of economic thought.
A rather unusual choice for the time, his first article in a professional journal
was a history of the foreign trade doctrines of the Physiocrats (Bloomfield,
1938), originally written as a term paper for Viner’s course.
Under Viner’s supervision Bloomfield received his Ph.D. from Chicago
in 1942. His doctoral dissertation was devoted to another typical Vinerian
issue: the role of capital imports in the structure of American balance of
payments. After completion, Bloomfield immediately joined the staff of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where he was a senior economist and
consultant from 1942 until 1958, when he joined the University of
Pennsylvania as a professor of economics.1
While at Chicago, Bloomfield devoted time and energies to study the
leading figures in American economics, including the institutionalist school.
A long essay on Thorstein Veblen was produced as a term paper for Frank
Knight’s course on “Economics from an Institutional Standpoint.” This
essay is published here for the first time.2
There are several reasons that suggest publication. First, Bloomfield’s
essay on Veblen provides some evidence on his early works and the way
they influenced his scientific career. Remarkable are, in our view, his
capacities as a 23-year-old graduate student to produce an original piece
on Veblen’s analysis of American industrial system and provide convin-
cing arguments on the way he had both deeply influenced American econ-
omists and anticipated the real course of events. Second, it is a paper
that adds something on our knowledge of what it was like studying eco-
nomics at the University of Chicago in the 1930s, particularly regarding
the requirements of the graduate curriculum. It also provides evidence on
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the role that Frank Knight, together with Viner and other senior econo-
mists, played in fostering pluralism in methods and the selection of topics
among their most promising graduate students. In this respect, the paper
shows how the history of economics and the critical overview of past
works played an important part in the making of a junior economist. As
Bloomfield recalled, his studies in these topics had a decisive influence in
his future career. It was in his early days at Chicago that Bloomfield
addressed the perpetual question of the usefulness of history for the mak-
ing of an economist and acquired a strong personal awareness on its
behalf:
The history of economic thought has long been the subject of considerable controversy
regarding its usefulness as an academic discipline and as a field for serious study and
research. On the one hand it has been denigrated by some economists as of little value
and as a kind of waste of time … on the other hand there are those who insist that the
history of economic thought is absolutely essential in the training and continuing edu-
cation of economists. They argue that no self-respecting economist should lack a rea-
sonably detailed knowledge of the writings of the great economists and schools of
thought of the past. I share this point of view. … most probably it was my interest in
international economics rather than in intellectual history as such that prompted me to
write these essays. (Bloomfield, 1994, p. 20)
A final, though not minor, reason for publication regards the original
insights that can be found in this work regarding the interpretation of
Veblen’s works. In a comparative way, Bloomfield intertwines a complex
network of threads which from Veblen link together some of the most
outstanding interpreters of capitalism, including Marx and Keynes, whose
General Theory had just been published. The fundamental dichotomy
between finance and industry is the guiding principle that leads
Bloomfield’s reading of Veblen’s works. On the whole, then, the paper
shows how, as a graduate economics student, Bloomfield had already devel-
oped an extraordinary scholarship on economic and methodological mat-
ters, as well as a remarkable familiarity with the most recent institutionalist
literature on the matter.
The following section introduces the reader to the intellectual environ-
ment at the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago, in
which institutional economic thought had been a debated topic since the
1910s. In particular, since Bloomfield’s paper was conceived as part of the
requirements of a course offered by Frank Knight, we have decided to
focus particularly on the latter’s views on Thorstein Veblen and institu-
tional economics. In the third section of this introductory note, we shall
examine in some detail Bloomfield’s original interpretation of Veblen.
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KNIGHT, VEBLEN, AND THE HISTORY OF
INSTITUTIONALISM AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO
While at Chicago, in addition to Viner, Bloomfield took classes with almost
all the leading figures of the “early” Chicago school, such as Frank H.
Knight, Oskar Lange, Paul H. Douglas, Theodore O. Yntema, John U.
Nef, and Lloyd Mints.3 As to Knight, Bloomfield (1994, p. 5) describes him
as a “profound scholar,” although, he confessed, “[he] was not to me as sti-
mulating a lecturer as Viner.” In his Chicago reminiscences Bloomfield
asserts that he took “several courses” with Knight, including history of eco-
nomic thought:
Frank Knight … made us read from Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Mill, Marshall and
many others; and we were also assigned several of his own articles, especially his
famous paper in the 1935 Canadian Journal. All this, plus his learned if at times tedious
lectures, were a tremendous improvement on my introduction to the subject at McGill.
But my interest in the history of economic thought came mainly from the teaching and
writings of Viner. (Bloomfield, 1994, p. 17)
However, Bloomfield provides no information about Knight’s course on
“Economics from an Institutional Standpoint,” numbered Economics 305.
From evidences retraced by Malcolm Rutherford (2010, p. 32), we learn
that Knight taught that course from 1932 to at least 1942, although the
course was not offered with continuity. In a 1937 letter to his friend and
institutionalist “rival” Clarence Ayres, Knight himself offers a rather telling
(and provocative) description of the aim and contents of the course. The
letter reveals the little value that Knight attached to the constructive side of
the institutionalist doctrine, particularly as an instrument to understand
real economic events:
You probably know that I attempt to give a course on “Economics from an
Institutional Standpoint.” I am taking the liberty of inflicting on you my latest out-
line and reading list. I would very much appreciate critical comments, and especially
suggestions of good short reading. … It is unnecessary to say that I don’t place any
very high estimate on the constructive value of institutionalist writings as known to
me  including those of C. E. Ayres! What I would like to do would be to take the
“challenge” seriously and make some real contribution toward an understanding of
institutional development. In this connection, I am convinced that legal philosophy
and legal history form the main item which needs emphasis, with religion probably
in second place. (Knight to Clarence E. Ayres, 16 February 1937; quoted in
Samuels, 1977, p. 305)
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In the same letter Knight included the following outline for Economics
305, to be taught in Winter 1937 (which makes this most likely the version
of the course that was actually taken by Bloomfield):
I. The Institutionalist Movement.
II. The Historical Schools of Economic Thought.
III. General Problems; Institutions, their Origin and Development.
1. The Meaning of Institutions.
2. Process and Causality in Institutional Change (in addition to
above).
IV. The Institutional View of Economic Life. The task of institutionalism
that of accounting historically for the factors treated as data in ratio-
nalistic, price-theory economics.





6. Economic Institutions as Embodied in Law.
(Knight to Clarence E. Ayres, 16 February 1937; quoted in Samuels,
1977, p. 305).4
Albeit incomplete and fragmentary, this list of topics reveals that Knight
had a deep understanding of the several dimensions of institutionalism.
Although the bulk of the readings for the course dealt with institutionalist
writers as they were properly understood  such as Veblen, Wesley C.
Mitchell, John R. Commons, John Maurice Clark, Walton H. Hamilton,
and others  his knowledge of the literature encompassed both U.S. and
European sources. What is also interesting is that Knight conceived institu-
tionalism as including German Historismus and the analysis of religious
beliefs, as determinants of the prevalent socio-economic philosophy of life,
provided by Werner Sombart, Max Weber, and Richard Tawney (Samuels,
2005, p. 144).
Knight’s keen interest in institutionalism, broadly conceived, appears to
be in line with his earlier methodological commitments. In 1924, writing
for Rexford G. Tugwell’s celebrated volume on The Trend of Economics, he
had distinguished between three distinct and equally necessary “methods of
treatment” in economics. The first is “economic theory in the recognized
sense,” which Knight mainly identified with marginalism and defined as
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“a study, largely deductive in character, of the more general aspects of eco-
nomic cause and effect, those tendencies of a price system which are inde-
pendent of the specific wants, technology, and resources” (Knight, 1935
[1924], p. 144). The second method is “applied economics,” which “should
attempt a statistical and inductive study of the actual data at the particular
place and time, and of the manner in which general laws are modified by
special and accidental circumstances of all sorts” (Knight, 1935[1924],
p. 144). Finally, the third division of economics is
the philosophy of history in the economic field, or what some of his votaries have cho-
sen to call “historical” and other “institutional” economics, studying the “cumulative
changes of institutions.” Insofar as it aspires to practical utility it will endeavor to pre-
dict long-period changes in the factors which applied economics accepts as data and
attempts to observe and use as bases of inference. As far as can be seen now, this third
division, even more than the second, is a field for the exercise of informed judgment
rather than for reasoning according to the canons of science. The movements of history
are to be “sensed” rather than plotted and projected into the future. (Knight, 1935
[1924], p. 144)
As we have argued elsewhere (Asso & Fiorito, 2007), Knight’s own ver-
sion of institutionalism differed both in its methodological and epistemic
foundations from the one advocated by the leading institutionalists of the
time. What concerns us here is that he saw American interwar institutional-
ism as epitomizing the pernicious alliance between the “social control”
approach to social policy, positivistic scientism, and Deweyan pragmatism
that emerged out of the American intellectual arena during the first two
decades of the last century (Fiorito, 2009, 2011). Although Knight’s favor-
ite target for criticism was the so-called “scientific” wing of the movement,
represented by younger figures such as Morris A. Copeland and Lawrence
K. Frank, he was by no means more generous with Veblen. He had in fact
firmly rejected the instinct-habit psychology on which Veblen’s evolution-
ary program was based (Asso & Fiorito, 2004), thus showing little consid-
eration for the heuristic value of his fundamental dichotomy: in his opinion
“the most serious defect of the Veblenian philosophy comes out in the con-
trast between pecuniary and industrial employments, of which so much is
made” (Knight, 1920, p. 519).5 Specifically, he held that the Veblenian
notion of a dichotomy between industry and business rested on an
“obvious fallacy,” namely, the idea that “society has a choice between pro-
ducing more goods and producing more value, and that it is the part of wis-
dom to prefer the former.” According to Knight, Veblen’s dichotomy was
intrinsically normative and missed the centrality of the value problem
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implied in every economic  i.e., instrumentally rational  decision.6 As he
put it:
The quantity of goods, if there is more than one kind, must so obviously be measured
in value units. The proposal of leaving it to technicians in the respective fields to say
how much social productive power shall be expended in each is merely grotesque; mili-
tary experts would use it all for the army and navy, the medical men could usefully
employ it all, and more, for health, and so on. There is no more important function of
a first course in economics than to make the student see that the whole problem of
social management is a value problem; that mechanical or technical efficiency is a
meaningless combination of words. (Knight, 1923, p. 582)
It should be noted that Knight did not deny  to some extent following
Veblen the problems arising from the separation between property and
control that was beginning to characterize the real nature of the American
corporation. “Those in control of the policies of a business,” he wrote in
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921, p. 333), “are almost inevitably in a bet-
ter position to foresee its future earnings than are outsiders, and it is diffi-
cult to prevent their taking advantage of this position to the detriment of
their efficiency as managers of productive operations.” Such a situation
becomes even worse when
the managers of productive property begin to manipulate their industrial and financial
policies with a view to producing changes in capital values, of which they inevitably
know in advance of outsiders and of which they take advantage with corresponding
ease. Instances of such action with enormous gains reaped by insiders are familiar to all
who know anything of modern corporation history. It is hard to see how they can be
prevented without a strengthening of the moral code of business and a strict application
of criminal law. (Knight, 1921, p. 334)
Thus, Knight was willing to concede that “this form of business
activity … perhaps it had been neglected unduly by economists,” but, he
immediately added: “Veblen’s allegation that such stealing through the pro-
duction of disturbances in business arrangements is the usual or character-
istic activity of modern economic life is of course merely humorous”
(Knight, 1921, p. 334 n1). And in a letter to Joseph Dorfman he sarcasti-
cally added:
I would really like to know what standing Veblen has or had, if any, in the field of
Archaeology, which is the foundation of his whole position. I have never happened to
know of any recognized archaeologist recognizing Veblen’s existence. If I am grossly
uninformed in that connection, I do wish you would give me references which would
enable me to get right. Another question which is, of course, impertinent to ask, but
about which I was even more puzzled, was whether your statement about Veblen’s
standing among “the economists who count” was meant seriously, or was intended to
be funny. (Knight to Dorfman, December 18, 1940; quoted in Fiorito, 2007)
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In spite of this (sometimes extremely harshly) critical stance which
regarded both its methodology and the building up of a new paradigm, it
remains true that Knight took institutionalism quite seriously and, more
significantly, considered it as an essential part of the “making of an econo-
mist” at Chicago. This is confirmed not only by the large portion of his
Economics 305 course devoted to the discussion of the movement (Samuels,
2005), but also by the fact that he regularly included questions on
American institutionalism and its leading advocates in the Ph.D. qualifying
exams on Economic Theory at the University of Chicago. As documented
by Fiorito (2012), aside issues of pure theory, Ph.D. candidates in econom-
ics at Chicago were in fact requested to prove a specific acquaintance with
institutionalism and its basic philosophical postulates. What follows are all
questions with an explicit institutionalist content that are found in the qua-
lifying exams during the 1930s. Significantly, the first question is dated
1932, the very year that Knight began to teach his Economics 305 course:
(1932 spring) Discuss the relationship between the conclusions and assumptions of the
neo-classical school, the Weber-Sombart school and the American institutionalists.
(1932 summer) Summarize and appraise the contribution of Veblen to economic
thought.
(1932 autumn) Briefly state your conception of the nature of institutional economics,
its relation to the price-type theory type of economics and its value to the student.
Comment on the work of Adam Smith, J.S. Mill and Alfred Marshall with regard to
the adequacy of the consideration given by them to institutional factors, and discuss
the desirability of replacing the standpoint of Marshall by that of any institutionalist or
group of institutionalists.
(1933 autumn) Briefly characterize and evaluate comparatively what you consider the
significant ‘‘approaches’’ or methodologies in economic science. (The following are to
be taken as suggestive catch-words: classical, inductive, institutional, deductive, price-
theory, sociological, socialistic, control.) Where possible, cite examples of the different
tendencies in the history of economic thought from the Greeks to the present.
(1935 autumn) Indicate briefly the position of the institutional school of economists in
America. With what earlier movements in the history of doctrine could it be compared,
giving illustrative names in both cases.
(1937 summer) Sketch the relation between the economic doctrines of Marx and
Veblen, relating both positions to the problem of an ‘‘institutional economics’’ and to
the writings generally representative of this position.
BLOOMFIELD ON VEBLEN
Given the above, therefore, it is not surprising that some  plausibly not a
few  of Knight’s students decided (or were requested) to write a term
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paper on some institutionalism-related themes. Along with the
Bloomfield’s paper reproduced here, Rutherford (2011, p. 32) points out
that Kenneth Parson’s article on “John R. Commons’ Point of View”
(Parsons, 1942) also originated as a term paper for Knight’s Economics
305 course. In terms of the candidacy exam questions identified above,
Bloomfield’s paper addresses at least two of them: the contributions of
Veblen and the comparison of Veblen with Marx.
In his introductory remarks Bloomfield was wary enough to make no
special claim of “originality” in his interpretation of Veblen, “although I
believe that I have brought together in this essay the results of a certain
amount of reading and thought, which I hope may cast a little bit of addi-
tional light on Veblen’s work.” Indeed, the paper offers a clear presentation
of Veblen’s methodological critique of neoclassical economics and shows
how this could be combined with his evolutionary approach for a better
understanding of the American industrial system, characterized as it was by
distortions, abuses, and inefficiencies. Essentially Bloomfield  who him-
self had Eastern European grandparents  follows Dorfman in recalling
how Veblen’s origins played a great part in his attacks against the
American Captains of Industry and in designing a fundamental clash
between the real production of goods and the effortless and damaging
behavior of the financing and business class. Apart from these considera-
tions there are several interesting and suggestive insights that may be found
in Bloomfield’s critical scrutiny of Veblen’s works. The following are a few
illustrative examples.
The Fundamental Dichotomy Revisited
Bloomfield’s paper focuses mainly, albeit not exclusively, on Veblen’s well-
known dichotomy between industrial and pecuniary pursuits. Significantly,
as we have seen before, this was the aspect of Veblen’s thought that had
attracted Knight’s major criticisms. “Briefly stated,” Bloomfield writes:
The general idea is that whereas considerations of serviceability and general social wel-
fare demand the maximum production of wealth at the lowest price, considerations of
‘vendibility’ and business expediency demand rather a restriction of production, a ‘con-
scientious withdrawal of efficiency’ and all manner of disserviceable and predatory
activities, with the result that the economic system is in a continual state of underpro-
duction, booms, and depression.
Accordingly, Bloomfield explains, for Veblen the industrial system is gov-
erned by the physical laws that determine the technological process and the
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technical constraints on the potential production and distribution of goods.
Conversely the pecuniary system around which business activities are orga-
nized is the result of our social institutions: the conception and legal articu-
lation of private property, commercial laws and customs, and financial
contracts. Throughout the paper Bloomfield develops some critical analysis
of Veblen’s dichotomic schema. From the outset, however, he makes clear
that Veblen’s system of thought is tainted by an “overwhelming stress and
emphasis on the technological.” As he put it:
Veblen had what might be termed a “technological bias.” He was one of the first to
understand and realize the significance of the great change that had taken place in the
“state of the industrial arts” in America. The effect of the new age of power and
machinery on men’s habits, ideals and outlooks is clearly stated. The technological bias
colored his thought and analysis at every turn, and accounts for many of the rather
unusual conclusions at which he arrived. For example, this accounts for his idea that
the real productive classes in the community, and the symbol of productive efficiency
are the engineers, the technicians and the industrial experts, and not the proletariat, as
with Marx. It also explains the rather curious conclusion that these men are to be the
ones who will effect the “revolutionary overturn” and control the destinies of the recon-
structed society.
Such a technological bias, Bloomfield insists, also explains the “rather cur-
ious conclusion” that the engineers are to be “the ones who will effect the
‘revolutionary overturn’ and control the destinies of the reconstructed
society.” This specific criticism will be taken up below.
Veblen and His Contemporaries on the Constructive Side of
Institutional Economics
This critical premise notwithstanding, Bloomfield recognizes the construc-
tive nature of Veblen’s contribution and finds some important parallels
between his analysis of business enterprise and that advanced by other
leading writers of the time. For instance, Bloomfield argues that Veblen’s
discussion of non-perfectly competitive markets “foreshadowed much of
the important work subsequently done by Chamberlin, Sraffa, Joan
Robinson, Zeuthen, Harrod, Stackelber and others.” In particular, Veblen
intuitively recognized that all industrial enterprises  at some stage or
another  reap advantages from a more or less significant degree of mono-
polistic power which is a major cause for production cuts, predatory activ-
ities and other forms of “conscientious withdrawal of efficiency.” Specific
attitudes toward monopolistic power were again reinforced by the
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dichotomic nature of capitalism, as they are basically derived from different
sorts of all intangible assets which constitute business capital. Thus, the
increasingly complex network of immaterial relations on which the modern
firm was based  so Veblen argued  tended to produce no aggregate
advantage to the community as a whole, though they became a decisive ele-
ment of cumulative crisis and cyclical collapse of aggregate production.
In a similar fashion, Bloomfield asserts that “in much of his analysis of
the modern corporation and in the sharp separation of ownership and con-
trol, multiple capitalization, etc. Veblen foreshadowed much of the work
subsequently done by Berle and Means, and incidentally in the work of
these latter men, Veblen’s conclusions are largely supported.” Interestingly,
when dealing with Veblen’s (1921, p. 8) contention that “any country that
is organized on the price system… habitual unemployment of the available
industrial plant and workmen in whole or in part, appears to be the indis-
pensable condition without which tolerable conditions of life cannot be
maintained,” Bloomfield finds it “remarkably similar to the conclusions
arrived at, by a more circuitous and a priori route, by Mr. Keynes.”
Bloomfield’s knowledge of Keynes’ work dated back at McGill University
where in the fall of 1936 he was asked to give a seminar in the Hemmeon
class on the just appeared General Theory, revealing, however, that his
instructor had provided “little or no guidance in understanding it.” What is
significant here is that at Chicago Bloomfield developed a capacity to find
similarities between Veblen and Keynes’s conceptions of “underemploy-
ment equilibrium”: an affinity that in the academic literature would only be
pointed out 2 years later by Rutledge Vining (1939) in his famous article on
“Suggestions of Keynes in the Writings of Veblen.”
As far as Veblen’s direct influence on his contemporaries is concerned,
however, Bloomfield’s main target was Herbert J. Davenport. According to
Bloomfield, Veblen’s dichotomy between industrial and pecuniary employ-
ments was reflected in Davenport’s distinction between “business” and
“industrial” capital. As he explained:
In fact, the general thesis of his Economics of Enterprise (1913) is that individual gain
does not necessarily coincide with social welfare, and that capital in possession of the
individual need not correspond with wealth as a substantial resource in the community.
He thus clearly distinguishes capital as a pecuniary, acquisitive concept and as a pro-
ductive concept. All through his works runs the central idea that valuation in terms of
private capital does not necessarily reflect production in the social sense. The predatory
aspect of capital is summed up in his words to the effect that “a great part of the 120
billions of American wealth … is made up of one form or another of capitalized privi-
lege or of capitalized production” (1913, p. 519). In fact, as he continues, “two-thirds of
the durable private bases of income in the United States are nothing else than the
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capitalization of privilege or predation. The market value of these non-social or antiso-
cial forms of private capital is merely the present worth of the right to exact tribute
from one’s fellows or to plunder one’s fellows” (1913, p. 529). He lays much stress on
“unearned income” (corresponding to the “free income” of Veblen’s “absentee owners”)
and traces it to three chief sources: (1) capitalized bounty of nature (rent, etc.); (2) capi-
talized predation (restriction of output, deterioration of products, etc.); (3) capitalized
privilege (franchises etc.). The trouble with economists, contends Davenport, is that
they have “assumed that private gain and social welfare are approximately interchange-
able concepts… (they) have failed to recognize that some of the capital is as iniquitous
and disastrous for social welfare as some of the capital is beneficent” (1913, p. 519).
The parallelism here to Veblen is so obvious as to preclude the need for any further
comment.
Bloomfield’s appraisal of Davenport along Veblenian lines shows the
clear influence of Knight  who had spoken of Davenport’s “almost fer-
vent admiration for Veblenism” (Knight, 1931, p. 9)  and appears to be
in contrast with recent attempts to assess Davenport along strictly Austrian
lines (Gunning, 1998).
Veblen on the Future of Capitalism
Following Knight, Bloomfield’s analysis becomes more unsympathetic
when he goes on to examine Veblen’s views concerning the future of capit-
alism. According to Bloomfield, in The Theory of Business Enterprise,
Veblen (1904) saw two possible future scenarios emerging out of this inher-
ent conflict between business and industry. The first would be “a reversion
to the ancient dynastic state, based on a Romantic philosophy, with stress
on ceremonial, pageantry, graded dignity, allegiance, piety, servility and
war”  a situation that Bloomfield found epitomized by the then current
authoritarian regimes in Italy and Germany. The second scenario would
imply a “revolutionary overturn,” establishing a “system based on consid-
erations of serviceability and human welfare”  a possibility toward which
Veblen had become much more skeptical in his later works. If a revolution
were ever to come about in America, however, Veblen believed it would
occur through the establishment of a “Soviet of Technicians.” “It was
here”  Bloomfield notes  “that Veblen placed all his faith in the engi-
neers, technicians and industrial experts” and that his “technological bias”
becomes more evident. If such a Soviet of Technicians should acquire con-
trol over the whole industrial system, Veblen argued, its motivations would
be to provide a more efficient management of the community material wel-
fare. It would correct the deficiencies of management by businessmen and
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concentrate its powers on those areas of industrial administration where
the business system has most conspicuously failed. As for the revolutionary
overturn itself, there need be neither violence nor mass demonstration  all
that would be necessary would be a “general strike” of the country’s techni-
cians, bringing industry to a standstill. The absentee owners would then
either abdicate or be dispossessed by a legal order cancelling all corpora-
tion securities.
Bloomfield raises two distinct objections to Veblen’s revolutionary
scheme. First, he points out the utopian  “naive” in his words  nature
of Veblen’s reasoning. Ruling classes do not give up their privileges on
request, nor there appeared to be any reason why engineers as a class
should be immune from the pecuniary logic of the vested interest. As
Bloomfield explained:
In the first place, Veblen appears excessively naı¨ve in his belief that the revolutionary
overturn could be achieved by a mere strike on the part of the engineers. Long before
anything like that happened, either the engineers would be “bought off” or a Fascist
regime would be set up. To think that the capitalist class would idly sit by and allow
their Vested Interests to be expropriated, is to completely misapprehend their strength,
and completely misread recent European history. Thus although Veblen may have been
a radical subjectively, he was a Fascist objectively.
However pertinent Bloomfield’s remarks in this connection may be, he
neglects to acknowledge that Veblen was always careful to qualify his spec-
ulations with the disclaimer that the engineers themselves “are a scattering
lot of fairly contented subalterns, working piecemeal under orders from the
deputies of the absentee owners,” while “the working force of the great
mechanical industries … are still nearly out of touch and out of sympathy
with the technical men, and are bound in rival trade organizations whose
sole and self-seeking interest converges on the full dinner-pail” (Veblen,
1921, p. 104).
Second, Bloomfield held that “Veblen’s views on the future society are
woefully inadequate, and leave out some vital issues.” In Bloomfield’s eyes,
only the market system and the price mechanism are capable of objectively
measuring the efficient allocation of resources:
Veblen believed that all that was necessary was for the Soviet of Technicians to take
control; the rest would be easy. Veblen falls into this trap by his same technological
bias. To him, the problem of the new society would be an engineering one entirely, or
at least almost entirely. To him it would merely be a matter of allocating resources
among the primary industries, and to produce the maximum possible under the existing
technological conditions, with the minimum of waste and inefficiency. To him the pro-
blems of economic organization were largely technical and engineering ones. But such
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fundamental problems (problems of collectivist society would also have to meet) as the
proper and “rational” allocation of resources among alternative uses, the position of
free consumers’ choice, the method of distribution and the criteria to be followed, eco-
nomic incentives, the relation between the “controllers” and the “controllees”  these,
and many other fundamental problems which any economic society would have to
meet, are all completely neglected  Veblen has nothing to say of them. Not that these
problems are entirely insoluble, but the fact remains that they are entirely overlooked
in the analysis. Veblen’s concept of social welfare was solely that of the maximum pro-
duction of goods and services at the least cost; he naively believed that such could be
achieved merely by disallowing Absentee Ownership and putting engineers and techni-
cians in control. The real problem of social welfare involves much more than merely
that. The whole question of distribution is fundamental.
Here Bloomfield follows Knight in interpreting Veblen as advocating a
complete displacement of the “price system” and a substitution of technolo-
gical value for value as measured by market price. Bloomfield focuses on
The Engineers and the Price System (1921) as this was representative of
Veblen’s thought or, at least, exemplified important tendencies in it.
Actually, the relation of The Engineers and the Price System to Veblen’s
earlier contributions has been the source of some controversy. While
Donald Stabile (1984, p. 15), on the basis of this work, sees Veblen as one
of the inspiring sources of the Technocratic movement and argues that
“Veblen was the chief ideologue of the New Class of coordinators,” Rick
Tilman (1996, p. 177) affirms that the position sketched there by Veblen
can best be viewed as “an expository device expressing satirical intent, not
as a serious plan for economic reconstruction.” Bloomfield, who points out
“the remarkable parallelism between Veblen’s conclusions and those of the
Technocrats,” clearly sides with Stabile’s interpretation.
Veblen and Marx
What was Bloomfield’s final verdict on Veblen’s theory of business enter-
prise? Interestingly, although Bloomfield had developed his analysis of
Veblen in somewhat critical terms, his overall judgment appears to be defi-
nitely more favorable than Knight’s. Unlike his teacher, in fact, Bloomfield
has no hesitation in expressing his own personal agreement with Veblen’s
condemnation of the parasitical function of much of the business
community:
It happens to be my own personal point of view (whatever that may be worth) that
Veblen’s general conclusions as to the nature of Business Enterprise are substantially
true. Our system is not producing as much as it could, and frankly, I do not hold out a
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great deal of hope that much improvement can be expected, least of all by any “positive
program of laissez-faire.”7 One of the most serious problems facing America today is
that of underproduction, the existence of which can be largely if not entirely traced to
the fact that making goods is subordinated to the making of money. I do believe that
many of the activities of our business leaders, especially those in strategic positions, are
definitely of an anti-social nature, and that the wage-earner and the consumer are the
direct sufferers. Anyone who examines the literature of corporation finance and the
reports of Industrial Commissions will find ample information to support these conten-
tions. Nor do I hold out great hopes for a rectification of these abuses, but look on
them rather as the inevitable result of the present system. The same conclusions apply
to monopoly and tariffs. I do believe that there is much truth to the “contradictions of
capitalism” of which Veblen wrote, and that though capitalism has made remarkable
advances, we should always remember that the real criterion of its success is not what it
has done, but what it could have done under the existing state of industrial arts.
On the other hand, Bloomfield followed Knight in arguing that Veblen
offers no viable alternative to private ownership and control of the means
of production and use of the existing market mechanism:
Where Veblen fell down was that although he clearly elaborated on the abuses and inef-
ficiency of capitalism, he did not offer a workable alternative. He thought that a society
directed by engineers would be the solution to the problem. But as I pointed out before,
the problem is not as simple as all that. Even the method he proposed whereby his
reconstructed society could be achieved is clearly inadequate, and excessively naı¨ve.
“It appears to me,” Bloomfield concluded, “that Marx was much more
logical and realistic on this score.” Indeed, the reference to Marx is not
incidental. Bloomfield devotes in fact the end of his paper to a brief digres-
sion “on the relation of Veblen to Marx, whom he closely resembles.” “The
more I read of Veblen,” he insists, “the stronger does this resemblance
become.” While Bloomfield concedes that there are some fundamental dif-
ferences between the two thinkers, he believes them to be at the periphery
and not at the core of their analyses of the capitalistic process: “The chief
points of major difference are really few.” As to their philosophies of his-
tory, whereas Marx adhered to the preconceptions of teleological formula-
tions, Veblen questioned the assumption that there are institutional
tendencies that can be predicted with the certainty of the natural sciences.
While Marx believed in a direct connection between the poverty and
oppression of the working class and their collective impulse to challenge
the power structure of capitalism, Veblen “objected to Marx’s concept of
‘conscious’ human nature” and “demanded a more ‘realistic’ psychology.”
As far as their theories of business enterprise are concerned, Bloomfield
continues, “the chief difference lies, I think, in their concepts of capitalistic
‘exploitation.’” On the one hand, Marx emphasized the exploitation of the
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working class through the capitalist class’s control of the means of produc-
tion while his analysis proceeds from his own labor theory of value: “For
labor is the source of all value; the capitalist appropriates a substantial
portion of this by buying labor-power at one price and selling labor at
another; ergo, the laborer is exploited of the fruits of his labor.” On the
other hand, Veblen rejected the labor theory of value and emphasized the
exploitation of the underlying population through the control of the mar-
ket system by big business. The difference in perspective is well explained
by Bloomfield:
According to Veblen the labor theory of value was all wrong. “Exploitation” under his
scheme took the following shape: the community is not getting the volume and quality
of goods and services which it deserves. There is a capitalistic sabotage  production is
held back, and the underlying population is being deprived of the fruits of the advance
in the state of the arts; the usufruct of what is the common property of the community
at large has fallen into the hands of a small group. The question of “distribution” in the
Marxian sense is not discussed at all. Veblen is not interested in whether the capitalist
class is extorting a surplus-value from the laboring class. He is interested in the fact
that the laboring class is being bereft of what the advance in the state of the arts could
logically furnish them, due to restriction of production, and other waste or inefficiency
characterizing a capitalist economy.
In spite of these differences, however, Bloomfield asserts that “Veblen
comes very close to Marx in analysis.” To Bloomfield, Veblen’s notion of
“free income”  that is, income derived from intangible assets rather than
a return from productivity  shows a clear resemblance to Marx’s “surplus
value,” while Veblen’s open condemnation of absentee ownership seems to
suggest that he “had in mind something approaching a labor theory of
value.” All this led Bloomfield to reiterate his belief that “the two writers
are closer in analysis, if not in conclusions, than is commonly assumed.”8
FINAL REMARKS
At the end of this brief note there is still one crucial aspect that we have left
unexplored. Why did Knight, in spite of his outspoken critical stance to
institutionalism, expect his students to devote so much time to reading
works by American institutionalists and to write research papers on institu-
tionalist themes? In venturing an explanation for this apparent paradox, we
must first remember that in the mid-1930s institutionalism was by no
means a dying force in American economics.9 This was true especially in
terms of the discipline’s impact on American economic policy. While the
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Keynesian revolution was still in the making, both within and outside aca-
demia, institutionalists such as Rexford Tugwell, Walton H. Hamilton,
Gardner Means, John Maurice Clark, Isador Lubin, and Mordecai Ezekiel
had made important contributions to the conception and implementation
of the New Deal reformist agenda (Barber, 1996). Incidentally, in his essay
Bloomfield ably detects Veblen’s influence on a then popular writer like
Stuart Chase  who allegedly inspired the expression “a New Deal”
(Vangermeersch, 2005).
Just as important, interwar neoclassicism in America was a contested
terrain (Morgan & Rutherford, 1998). In this connection, a couple of years
before Bloomfield arrived in Chicago, Knight (1934a, 1934b) had not hesi-
tated to firmly distance himself from Robbins’s seminal effort to define
economics as the rational allocation of scarce means among competing and
unlimited ends. Specifically, Knight was bothered by Robbins’ attempt to
characterize economics as a positive science and by his exclusive emphasis
on the notion of material scarcity.10 In a strikingly Veblenian fashion,
Knight wrote in 1936 that “the real scarcity which seriously afflicts indivi-
dualistic civilization is the scarcity of such things as distinction, spectacular
achievements, honor, victory, and power  which is clearly not to be cured
by any application of scientific technique” (Knight, 1936, p. 234). One of
Robbins’ goals was to expunge from the realm of scientific economics any
vestige of institutionalism and historicism (Howson, 2004), and yet here
was his friend Knight attending to what Robbins wished to expunge. Given
the above, then, we cannot but conclude by referring to Warren Samuels,
who advances three possible explanations for Knight’s teaching a course on
institutionalism:
First, he was bothered by institutionalism; he thought the institutionalists were not only
wrong in what they said and tried to do, they were dangerous to society and to econom-
ics. Second, he appreciated that unlike the professional work of most neoclassicists, the
work of the institutionalists dealt with important questions. Third, he appreciated
that many things taken as given, or unexamined, by neoclassical economics were actu-
ally in a process of evolution  one of institutionalism’s important claim. (Samuels,
2005, pp. 150, 151)
NOTES
1. From 1949 to 1950, while at the New York Fed, Bloomfield served as a
financial adviser to the Bank of Korea, helping to create the foundation of the
country’s central bank. He later served as a financial adviser to the Korean
Ministry of Finance and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
(Alacevich & Asso, 2009).
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2. Arthur I. Bloomfield’s essay “Thorstein Veblen and His Analysis of Business
Enterprise” is published here for the first time, as far as the present editors can
determine. The typewritten manuscript was found among the Bloomfield’s papers
at the Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library of Duke University and is
reproduced with its permission at the end of this introduction. In editing the manu-
script no major problem arose: minor errors in spelling and punctuation have been
corrected, while full references to the sources cited by Bloomfield in the text have
been provided and arranged according to contemporary standards.
3. In this connection, Bloomfield (1992, p. 2058) recalls: “When I was at
Chicago I never heard of, nor suspected the existence of, a ‘Chicago School’ of eco-
nomics. On the contrary, I was then impressed by the diversity of thinking and
interests of the individual faculty members.” On the pluralistic nature of US inter-
war economics see the classic contribution by Morgan and Rutherford (1998).
4. Student’s notes from Knight’s Economics 305 for the academic year
19331934, including a complete syllabus, are reproduced in Samuels (2005).
5. By contrast, it should be pointed out that Knight (1935) phrased his review
of Commons’ Institutional Economics (1934) in mildly sympathetic terms.
6. This is by no means to imply that Knight did not acknowledge the limitations
of instrumental rationality when dealing with his own version of institutionalism. In
this connection, despite their different philosophies, there are important points of
convergence between Veblen and Knight. See the discussion in Asso and Fiorito
(2007), Hodgson (2004), and Tilman (1992).
7. Bloomfield’s reference here is to Henry Simons’ famous pamphlet A Positive
Program for Laissez-Faire: Some Proposal for a Liberal Economic Policy. Simon
was an outspoken critic of New Deal economic programs, most particularly, as
pointed out by William J. Barber (1996, p. 90), of those associated to institutional-
ists like Tugwell. In his pamphlet, Simons (1948[1934], pp. 41, 42) affirmed that
“the real enemies of liberty in this country are the naive advocates of managed
economy or national planning,” and made a plea for a return to the founding prin-
ciples of “nineteenth century liberalism” which had been “subjected latterly to gross
misinterpretation and to shallow satirical jibes in the ‘new economics.’” Bloomfield
(1994, p. 6) recalls in his reminiscences:
I never took a course with Henry Simons, the exponent of the ‘positive program for
laissez-faire’ and along with Knight, regarded today as a member of the early ‘Chicago
school.’ But I did have several stimulating conversations with him. … [However] it was
from Douglas and Viner that I learned the importance of knowing the real world and
real-world problems before attempting to apply abstract economic theory to reality,
especially when offering policy recommendations.
8. The MarxVeblen relationship was a debated issue in the literature of the
period. While an early interpreter such as Richard V. Teggart had pointed out the
Marxian character of Veblen’s analysis of capitalism, Abraham L. Harris contended
that “it is only in broad outline that their works can be held to be similar.”
According to Harris (1934a, p. 840: see also Harris, 1934b):
Veblen, like Marx, viewed economic society from the standpoint of change and posited
economic factors as the motivating forces of change. He did not subscribe, however, to
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Marx’s historical materialism as the author seems to think. The mechanics through
which Veblen’s economic factors take their effect upon human consciousness and
the course of history are the conflicting habits of occupational discipline rather than the
dialectics of class struggle. If the author had seen this difference and had carried the
analysis of it far enough he would have found a more satisfactory explanation of why
Veblen’s dissent remained purely intellectual and Marx’s created a popular movement.
9. In 1938 Albert B. Wolfe wrote to Wesley C. Mitchell: “It just happens that
in our department here [University of Ohio] with forty members, we have some
dyed-in-the-wool mathematical equilibriumists and also a number of men who are
convinced that deductive economics is futile and that the only fruitful point of
view is institutionalism” (Wolfe to Mitchell, October 26, 1938; quoted in Fiorito,
2000, p. 269).
10. As Knight put it in his personal correspondence with Robbins: “I am inclined
to think that the fundamental judgment stressed so much in your book, of an abso-
lute contrast between judgments of facts and judgments of value, is actually the
basic error in the theory of nineteenth century liberalism. Stating it another way, I
am inclined squarely to reverse the maxim De gustibus non disputandum, in this
regard, and hold that only judgments of value can be discussed, facts as such not at
all. That is, when we disagree about a fact it seems to me we disagree about the
validity of observation or evidence, and that every disagreement is essentially a dif-
ference in evaluation” (Knight to Robbins, February 17, 1934; quoted in Asso and
Fiorito, 2007).
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